The Efficiency of Voting Selfishly

Is it more efficient to vote in our own interests or in the interests of the society? Prima facie, this seems to be a useless question with an obvious answer.

I approach the question using the framework of efficiency; that is, the extent to which preferences are satisfied by the allocation of limited resources.

 

It is almost certain that we are much more privy to our own preferences than the preferences of others, much less that of society as a whole. Thus, if the sole metric was to be the maximization of our preferences, it is clearly more desirable for the resources to be allocated with our own hands. After all, nobody ought to know our needs and wants better than ourselves. 

If we acknowledge that our intuitions on our preferences are more accurate, and if we were to consider voting as a means to most accurately determine the preferences of society, then it follows that voting is more accurate if everyone were to vote in their own interests, rather than in their guesstimates of what the common interest is. By adopting the pretense of voting in society's interest, there is a risk of converging on something which is merely a fiction, a perceived preference instead of an actual one.

A doctrine for helplessness

What is the best course of action if we are truly powerless to affect our circumstances?

How can we act if we are powerless? We cannot. Yet, however weak we are, we should always be the masters of our mentality. Whatever influence others hold upon us, it is surely possible to limit our perceptions and attitudes; failing to even have dominion over our minds, how are we even sentient?

It is foolish then, in the face of overwhelming circumstances, to wallow in self-pity and despair. However alien it may be, adopt a happy mindset! If thing are indeed so dire that such self-deception is impossible, then at least take the time to laugh on the joke that life is.

How cynical, you may say. But of the two alternatives, a) to accept facts and be tormented b) to deceive yourself and be happy, surely b) is preferable.

However ridiculous these words may sound, it should be considered. Too often we are confronted with things beyond our power to change or effect. Then we sulk and rage at these very things that are beyond us, as if our outburst changes anything. It does not. It is merely venting. Rather, we should recognize these very occasions for what they are, and to accept that there was nothing we could have done. Why burden yourself with the impossible?

Killing Newborn Babies

According to this article, a paper has argued that “newborn babies are not ‘actual persons’ and do not have a ‘moral right to life’”. Their line of argument appears to be that babies are not appreciably different from foetuses, and therefore since it is acceptable to abort foetuses, it is similarly morally acceptable to kill babies.

The argument is interesting, though not particularly novel. Often there is no clear distinction between a state where an action is morally tolerable, and another state where the same action is clearly immoral. At what point does a baby acquire sufficient relevant properties such that becomes a human (which is immoral for us to terminate)?

However, I think that there are morally relevant characteristics between a baby and a foetus. Consider the “bodily rights” argument, where the right to abort is justified by the mother’s rights over her body; the foetus does not have a right to force the mother to carry it. However, we should note that this particular argument does not apply to the baby! The right to abortion should not be interpreted as the right to kill the foetus; the death of the foetus occurs as an undesirable side-effect. Therefore, a strict equivalence would not be to kill a baby, but instead to leave it unattended (and presumably perish).

However, one important distinction still exists. Most people find the death of the foetus to be regrettable, even those in support of abortion. The key is that abortion inevitably results in the death of the foetus. Abortion may be morally justifiable if the rights of the woman to her body are adjudged to be of greater importance than the foetus’ right to life. In the case of an infant, though, no such counterbalancing right exists to justify the taking of the infant’s right to life.

On Capital Punishment

Regarding capital punishment, I can imagine a number of crimes so heinous that they are almost certainly unpardonable. Such black deeds can so shake our faith in humanity that we must instead draw the conclusion that these are the acts of no human, but instead of a monster. 

Human rights and protections should only be extended to humans. 

For those who universally reject the death penalty, they must be willing to forgive even the worst of acts. I do not believe that many have that capacity, only that they claim to.

Of course, the law is not, and should not be, determined solely on the basis of morality.

Suicide and Refusal of Life-Extension

What is the difference between the refusal of life-extension procedures and suicide? Suicide is the act of intentionally causing one's own death. By this definition, the two seem distinct. But is there a philosophical difference between an act that reduces one's potential life span from X to zero, and refusing an act that increase one's potential life span by X?

The idea seems to be that there is some natural life-span whereby it is immoral to willfully reduce, but perfectly acceptable to refuse to extend. This seems indefensible. If suicide is deemed wrong because it robs us of future choices (as per some arguments from liberty), then it is also wrong to refuse life-extension as it prevents us from enjoying the same future choices. If life is sacred (as per deontological argumenst) and has value in itself, then the loss of this life due to the non-adoption of life-extension procedures is also immoral.

Now, consider this thought experiment. Assume that one's remaining life span can be perfectly predicted in advance, and that that amounts to X years. Now, also assume that there exists some full treatment that can increase one's lifespan by Y years. One also has the option of taking a partial treatment that has a lesser effect, and extends life by only Z years, where Z is less than Y. Now, there are four people.

Person A refuses treatment, and lives X years.

Person B accepts partial treatment, and lives X+Z years.

Person C wants a partial treatment, but the center only offers full treatment. He accepts full treatment, but at the same time he swallows a poison that he knows will kill him in X+Z years time. He lives X+Z years.

Person D accepts full treatment. After X+Z years, he kills himself. He lives X+Z years.

If we accept that A is not immoral by his refusal of the life-extending procedure, then we must accept that B is not immoral by choosing a partial treatment. There is little practical difference between B and C; both live an additional Z years. Can we consider C to have committed suicide? While he has intentionally caused his own delayed death, his motivation is not to die, but instead to extend his life by Z rather than Y years. Therefore we do not consider it suicide.

What about D? Most would class it under suicide. But what are the philosophical differences between D and B,C? In all cases they do not want to live past X+Z years; the difference is only that D has made his choice rather late.

Tabula Rasa

Let's assume that utopia is possible, or if it’s not, let's instead imagine the state closest to utopia. Nobody would assert that today's world is that utopia. In fact, my suspicions are that it is impossible to ever arrive at that utopia via incremental steps.

One essential property of a utopia must be stability; it must be robust to degeneration into a state of non-utopia. I believe that achieving this single property requires the elimination of several unbalancing factors in today's world, as there are simply too many causes for conflict that would otherwise result in a collapse of the utopian society.

I then considered the design of an ideal society, without constraint. One important feature must be sustainability. Several ills can be attributed to the over-extended reach of humanity, which results in sub-optimal assignment of resources. If the population is to be distributed and controlled according to reasoned principles, then human numbers would be small, but localized to the most habitable regions where resources are ample and the incidence of natural disasters minimal.

My suspicions are also that social and familial structures would be different under a utopia. Social and familial structures are institutions founded on principles and assumptions that may not be the most optimal, but are merely too costly to change en masse.

A final, though dangerous, thought is that the people of an ideal society must themselves be superior to modern humans, not only in manner and philosophy, but perhaps, also in nature. There may be several genetic traits most conducive to an ideal society. Two properties that should, if possible, be selected for are empathy and restraint. Other physical advantages, such as resistance to disease or improved physical and mental abilities, are also boons that are almost certainly beneficial.

These lines of reasoning lead me to believe that it is difficult to form an ideal society, due to inertia and resistance. It is not possible to change social structures overnight, nor can the world population be reduced or redistributed. Incremental changes are simply not feasible.

Granted that the utopia is stable, any utilitarian must surely conclude that it is acceptable to usher in such a golden age via any means. Imagine if a dark age were declared specifically for the execution of 'any means', and any atrocity pardoned if it follows the grand plan. Utopia should then be treated as if it were founded on a blank slate.

The sole weakness of this idea is that it royally screws the present for the eternal future, which is why Utopia will never be realized.

Gifting

If I recall correctly, gifting is a practice that has negative overall utility. Prior experiments found that recipients of gifts tended to discount the value of the gift; for example, if a gift had cost $10, they deemed the gift to be worth less than $10. Perhaps unsurprising, given that gifts have a poor record of being exactly what people want. In the optimal case, gifts are exactly what you want, in which case nothing is gained over the case where you spend the money to acquire the item directly. In the worst case, you receive rubbish (from your point-of-view) and are worse off.

My analysis suffers from an assumption, which may be untrue. It assumes that the costs of gifts are equal for all people, i.e. you can't get the same gift at a lower cost than I can. However, sometimes this assumption is untrue. If one is able to obtain items at a discounted cost, then gifting makes sense. For example, if I were an artist, it is preferable to give people my artwork, since it does not cost me as much to 'buy' it as it does others. An alternative possibility is to gift others with items that you value poorly with respect to their generally perceived value; for instance if you hate bananas and happen to have some bananas, giving others the bananas is likely to improve the overall utility of the gifting scheme.

To summarize:

1. Gifting is generally bad for everyone, unless,
2. You give people something that you have a competitive advantage in procuring, or
3. You give people stuff you hate.

 I find the third conclusion particularly interesting. I believe it should be combined with the conclusions from my previous article on "Free Gifts".

Longevity

To live longer, to have more free time. These desires seem universal. I don't know whether they're good, though. With excess comes waste, and what at cost does that excess come?

Let's take longevity. We're all afraid of dying. We know the immeasurable extents that some will go to to extend their lifespans. I hesitate to ask, but is it worth it? Quantify the difference between living til 78 and dying at 80. Two years is a vast treasure in the hands of a spirited agent, but not so for someone who merely wishes to delay the inevitable. And the cost of it. Let's not mention the resources needed to counter ailments and disease. Retirement itself requires funds. To live longer means to work longer, more productive years lost to tedium and toil. 

I'm not defending a stone-age lifespan where we're all mayflies. To think so would be to commit the mistake of a false duality. Perhaps there's some optimal length of time that compels us to treasure our time, and is sufficient in length for us to fulfill all that we can reasonably desire to do. Perhaps not.

To Know Better, To Execute Better

Advice is one of those items that is very much unwanted if unsolicited. The audacity of them to think that they know better about us then we ourselves! What are we, incompetent? Stop interfering!

Could we say the same of paternalism, or even government in general? We don't need a strong hand constantly looking over our shoulder, prodding us in "our best interests". To be nagged or beaten, just to force us to act in line with some projected notion of what's best for us, strikes many as being quite unacceptable.

It's difficult to argue that others know us better than ourselves, though in several cases our confidence in our self-understanding is merely an illusion. So, let's just grant that we know what we want, for argument's sake. However, knowing what we what doesn't actually make us any better at obtaining or fulfilling such desires. Motive does not imply competence. This is even more true when it comes to more complex phenomena, such as society or government.

In politics, a false dilemma is often presented between a layman that knows nothing of the art of governing, but who knows the trials and tribulations of the populace, and a highly trained and efficient robot that unfortunately has no realistic idea of what anyone really wants. Let's avoid such false dualities. It does occur in nature, but only as a result of willful ignorance. It occurs when someone speaks from his experience, but does not study the consequences of his suggestions. It occurs when someone performs a correction, but does not bother learning whether there was a problem in the first place. Both are regrettable, possibly well-intentioned, but not correct.

Rule Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism is the moral policy that the right or ethical action in any circumstance is the action that results in the best outcome. Though there are several practical difficulties with utilitarianism, I think that it is still practicable in real life.

First, I'll need to define what practicable means. Amongst all the ethical theories, utilitarianism is the most difficult to implement and requires the most judgment. Rule-based or intent-based systems are considerably simpler for a moral agent to follow, since no moral calculation is generally required. Furthermore, utilitarians need to constantly assess each and every potential action, many of which may be irrelevant under different ethical systems, in order to obtain the "best" outcome. This cannot be considered as being practicable, as it requires mental and predictive capabilities far in excess of human capacity. I will also argue that spending time considering ethical decisions has a corresponding cost, by diverting time away from other positive actions. Therefore, in practical terms, a simplified form of utilitarianism is necessary.

It is wiser then to restrict the theory to what a human can reasonably do. The most obvious way is to rely on a rules-based framework. This framework consists of a set of moral principles or rules, much like deontological ethics. However, the rules are ultimately grounded in utilitarian principles and can be derived from utility calculus, averaged for general circumstance. Therefore, a person following this form of rule utilitarianism believes that by following these moral guidelines, utility is increased on average. Also, rule utilitarianism does not require strict adherence to the ethical principles proposed; it is consistent to violate some lesser principle, which on average yields better outcomes, if it is reasonably clear that the violation results in greater utility.

Offence

Why take offence? Why get angry? Nothing good would come out of it. Clearly it doesn't make you any happier, except comparatively when you drag someone else into the fight.

Yeah, so someone can't keep his mouth shut, or pass things through their brains before speaking. Yeah, so some people just have malice in their blood. So? It's not like we have much control over what others can or can't say. Let other people be other people. What we can control is ourselves, so let's do that.

The simplest method is distancing. Don't make yourself a participant. Better yet, treat the part of you that does feel offended as a subject of study. Look upon him and wonder, why does he feel offended? Is there any good reason, or none at all? Laugh at him, even. Cordon the negativity off.

Otherwise, just take a big stick and whack the hell out of your foe. There's no room for half-measures!

Voices in an Empty Room

Do you have a voice that no one has ever heard, a voice that only sounds when you are alone, a voice that chatters to you when you're in an empty room, a voice that speaks and seems not of your own?

A person has a great number of voices, each for a certain audience, and each to never show to another crowd. And of these voices, perhaps one, or perhaps a few, perform for none other than the private self.

And it is not the prime voice that we use internally. It may be voiced as an ally, praising and propping the very views one holds; or it may serve as an antithesis, standing in opposition. And at other times it acts in both roles, in synthesis. But the key is, they sound different, foreign perhaps.

They do not reside in the crevices of one's mind; they must be spoken out loud, given form in pitch and timbre. Madness, maybe, appearances of a person speaking to himself. But perhaps there are some things, or a great many things, that cannot be granted any other audience or counsel.

And in such cases we can only invoke the voices in an empty room.

Resolutions and the Crystalization of Desire

Let's talk about resolutions.

It's a list. A list of desires, to be exact. To look at it, what one does when writing a list of resolutions is essentially, putting one's desires to ink. I want to lose weight, I want to have a lower, I want to read 12 good books- I want, I want. And barring the case where one's resolutions are forced by another hand (in which case it still a desire, merely not yours), it does appear that resolutions are, at the heart of it, a crystallization of want and desire.

Typically we discourage people from having a heart full of desire. Two reasons, greed is bad, and we don't like to remind people how dissatisfied they actually are with their lives. What's so special about resolutions?

It is that we are both the recipient and the sender. Perhaps obviously, we list resolutions not in the vain hope that somehow they will come true (ha! false premise here), but to remind ourselves to act such that they come true.

Or at least, I hope that's what we're doing. It does lead us to think along certain lines, though. Let's be honest, most resolutions fail. Could this be related to the state of mind when writing the resolution?

Perhaps people that draft resolutions while thinking only of their desires would fail. This is good to have, this is good to be. Perhaps those resolutions that are realized are expressed in terms of the costs to be paid. This is good to do, this is good to work for.

In the end, for the resolution to be resolved, we need to have resolve.

Mental Laziness

There are some people who don't seem to know two hoots about anything of importance; not the name of the people running the country, nor of the workings of the world, nor of matters of common sense. You can't discuss literature with them, nor argue philosophy. And we think, how vacuous their minds are, perhaps not by any lack of capacity or ability, but by a strain of mental laziness, of a reluctance to examine.

But then we tend to endear ourselves to the idea of an absent-minded professor, someone so deep in thought that daily life seems to be neglected. He does not know about social graces or modern dresses, and has little opinion about food and gossip. But by some measure is this not also mental laziness? Is the neglect of the mundane considered a less troubling instance of laziness?

Maybe we should get off our high horses. Perhaps those who know naught about "higher things" are truly ignorant idiots in some sense, but then again, we are quite the same in other senses.

Requirements of Knowledge

I have made several mistakes in my thinking. Perhaps the arguments do not seem wrong, but that itself is irrelevant, for one does not need to be correct to seem correct; sufficient style is often able to make up for substance insufficient.

The key error is that my arguments follow from my position. If so, reason serves not to seek the truth, but to support whatever stand that has been chosen. This is not correct. Instead, the reverse method should be adopted, and a position decided based upon facts and reason.

To increase objectivity even for subjective affairs, I propose to first define a set of criteria by which one would be convinced or doubtful of a certain position. Often it is too easy to be mired in a debate where both sides have reasonable but not fully convincing arguments, where it is difficult to objectively and consistently weight both sides.

Gambling

Perhaps the worst thing about gambling is that it is quite so easy to condemn those who gamble, and to then wash our hands off their affairs. Those who have acquired gambling debts are often viewed with contempt, for their situation is almost entirely of their doing. After all, the choice to gamble, and often the intent to continue, was entirely theirs; oft it is mentioned that "nobody forced them to continue gambling!".

I might agree, but I also feel that there is something quite so subtly wrong.

It might be said that there is some element of addiction in gambling, but perhaps I am too harsh, for it might be more accurately be desired as a form of tunnel vision acquired in the pursuit of gains, or recovery of losses. Decisions taken by one in such states of mind are different from those taken in a normal state of mind. If so, we cannot fully blame the victim for his choices, for those choices are affected. Part of the moral responsibility must lie elsewhere.

Disaster Relief

Consider the following thought experiment, which I present as a series of questions.

1. Would you donate to help feed a starving and homeless person, who has no money to feed himself because he lost all his money gambling, or has spent all his money on drugs and similar vice?

Probably not, I might guess. On to the next question, then.

2. Would you donate to help feed a starving and homeless person, who is a victim of a natural disaster?

Most likely yes, assuming that one is not in greater need. Now, finally:

3. Would you donate to help feed a starving and homeless person, who is a victim of a natural disaster, given that it is also known that the person is the same fellow as in question 1?

There are two possible answers, and both raise interesting thoughts.

If we agree to help the person, then the strange scenario is that from the position of the drug addict/gambler, a natural disaster is more favorable than no natural disaster. The position may also be inconsistent.

Conversely, if we refuse to help the person, the scenario becomes somewhat morally distasteful. Should we then introduce background checks or means testing prior to dispensing aid? Or should we just dispatch help to areas which are more 'deserving' or 'worthy' of assistance?

Stone Soup

There once was a town which was ravaged by a harsh winter. Food was scarce, and everyone kept and hid whatever supplies that they had.

It was during this period of great scarcity that a tramp passed through the town. Curiously, the tramp trod to the town center and began boiling a pot of water. Within the pot lay a stone.

One townsman, being sufficiently perplexed by this weird occurrence, approached the tramp and inquired about the contents of the pot. To this question, the tramp replied that he was making a marvelous pot of stone soup. However, the soup would taste better with additional ingredients.

The townsman, tempted by the strange soup, decided to contribute. And so, in went some potatoes which the townsman had previously saved. The other townspeople, being similarly curious, followed suit, each adding their items to the pot.

Eventually, the pot of soup, now endowed with many ingredients, came to a boil. Unfortunately, the uncoordinated mess of random contributions resulted in a terrible soup which tasted like sewage. Deeply angered by this act of deception, the townspeople lynched the tramp and used his flesh to make a fresh pot of soup.

Conventional Moral:

Too many cooks make crap soup.

Philosophical Moral:

It is a mistake to believe that all properties of things are additive.

Motive

I think that perhaps we ascribe too much motive to the actions of our peers. It is almost as if they are but automatons slaved to purpose, without room for innocent randomness.

Perhaps we read too much into things, as if every minor movement is an indicator of some deep and unvoiced meaning. A momentary flitter of her gaze- ah, a sign of embarassment, or excitement!- or no, perhaps she's really feeling irritated? All this, or perhaps a grain of sand in the eye, and not necessarily hers.

The brain sees what it wants to see, tries to enforce a bit of order onto noise and nothingness. And perhaps there is nothing wrong with thinking too much, except when it causes unnecessary worry, grief, or false joy and hope.

Thoughts on Gattaca

I have just finished watching Gattaca, which I found it to be an extremely good movie. The theme of the movie is genetic determinism; the protagonist, Vincent Freeman, is a naturally conceived and thus genetically inferior person in a world where genetic screening and engineering has created an upper-class of the genetically superior. With his "in-valid" DNA, he is denied even an opportunity to become an astronaut; however, by deceiving the ever-present genetic tests with the exceptional genetic profile of a paraplegic ex-swimming star, and through keeping the disguise with intense passion and will, Vincent proves himself to be "as good as any, and better than most".

Without a doubt, the viewer empathizes with the situation of Vincent, and must surely agree that there is something more to humans than our genes; the greatest achievement is not in meeting our potential, but in surpassing our limitations.

And yet, at the same time, I find it difficult to refute the position adopted by the society in the world of Gattaca. Is it truly discrimination if there are significant differences in ability between the engineered and the merely human? The argument is barely weakened even if the possibility of a naturally conceived person being better (at a job) than one conceived artificially is acknowledged to exist; there seems to be little reason for a company to risk itself on such a gamble, or to spend extra resources to verify the ability of individuals that are unlikely to be the best candidate.

I must imagine that Gattaca's society would look unfairly upon "borrowed ladders", or people who deceive genetic tests by borrowing superior genetic profiles. The film may cause us to empathize with Vincent's position and view such deception in a positive light as a tool against genetic discrimination, as a equalizing weapon for those that are unfairly discriminated. But then again, in my mind I constructed a parallel scenario existing in our very own reality, of people who purchase false credentials, certifications, and qualifications. We would naturally find such actions contemptible. And yet, for at least of some of them, their lack of legitimate qualifications are not due to a lack of quality or ability, but by the unfairness of fate and circumstance. How different are the scenarios, and how different are our attitudes?